Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

Kaysville City v. Joseph Mulcahy III : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven C. Earl; King & King; Attorneys for Appellant.
Sharon S. Sipes; Gridley Ward Havas Shaw; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Kaysville v. Mulcahy, No. 960468 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/356

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

KING & KING, ESQUIRES
STEVEN C. EARL, Esquire (#6533)
Kaysville City Prosecutor
P. 0. Box 320
330 North Main Street
Kaysville, Utah 84037
Telephone: (801) 543-2288

UTAH COURT OF APHBAI.9
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
°[iQOL{(c%- CA
DOCKET NO.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KAYSVILLE CITY,
PlaintiffAppellant,
Case No. 960468-CA
-vs-

Argument Priority No. 10

JOSEPH MULCAHY III,
Defendant Appellee.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE ALFRED C. VAN WAGENEN, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

Sharon S. Sipes, Esquire
GRIDLEY WARD HAVAS SHAW &
THOMAS
Attorneys at Law
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

Steven C. Earl, Esquire
KING & KING
Attorneys at Law
330 North Main
P.O. Box 320
Kaysville, Utah 84037

Attorneys for DefendantAppellee

Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
iP*" 1 1 f***

DEC13 1996

COUBT OF APPEJ &L:-<

KING & KING, ESQUIRES
STEVEN C. EARL, Esquire (#6533)
Kaysville City Prosecutor
P. 0. Box 320
330 North Main Street
Kaysville, Utah 84037
Telephone: (801) 543-2288
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KAYSVILLE CITY,
PlaintiffAppellant,
Case No. 960468-CA
-vsArgument Priority No. 10
JOSEPH MULCAHY III,
DefendantAppellee.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE ALFRED C. VAN WAGENEN, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

Sharon S. Sipes, Esquire
GRIDLEY WARD HAVAS SHAW &
THOMAS
Attorneys at Law
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

Steven C. Earl, Esquire
KING & KING
Attorneys at Law
330 North Main
P.O. Box 320
Kaysville, Utah 84037

Attorneys for DefendantAppellee

Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
A.

Cases

B.

Statutes

iii
iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

A.

Nature of the Case

3

B.

Course of Proceedings

3

C.

Disposition at Trial Court

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT

10

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
COMPLAINANT DEWAYNE OLSEN HAD NO MORE
THAN A HUNCH THAT THE PERSON AT MR.
OLSEN'S DOORSTEP WAS THE DEFENDANT

10

POINT II
OFFICER HESLOP HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION
TO STOP THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE

15

A.
B.

C.

The Reasonable Suspicion Standard
Defined
Officer Heslop Was Justified
In Relying On The Dispatch Message
In Stopping The Defendant's Vehicle
The Davis
Knowledge
Suspicion
Committed

15

. . . 17

County Dispatcher Had
of Facts Creating A Reasonable
That The Defendant Had
Or Was Committing A Crime . . . 18
i

D.

The Davis County Dispatcher Was
Justified In Relying On The
Allegations Of A Known
Citizen Informant

22

CONCLUSION

25

ADDENDUM
Order Granting
Evidence

Defendant's

ii

Motion

to

28
Suppress

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Phillips, v. Hatfield.
904 P.2d 1108, (Utah App. 1995)

3

Provo City Corp. v. Spotts,
861 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah App. 1993)

16, 17

Spinelli v. United States.
393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969)

24

State v. Bvbee.
884 P.2d 906 (Or. App., 1994)

23, 24

State v. Case.
884 P.2d 1274 (Ut. App. 1994)

1, 2, 10, 18

State v. Harris.
671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983)

22

State v. Menke.
787 P.2d 527 (Utah App. 1990)

11,13

State v. Miller.
740 P.2d 1367 (Utah App. 1987

22

State v. Nguyen.
878 P.2d 1183 (Utah App. 1994)

16

State v. Pena.
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Ut. 1994)

1, 2

State v. Roth.
827 P.2d 255 (Utah App. 1992)

15

State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)

10

Terry v. Ohio.
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)

15

United States v. Hensley.
469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)

17

United States v. Sokolow
15, 16
490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)
iii

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §41-6-44

21

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §76-6-206

20

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §76-8-506

24

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §76-9-201

21

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §76-9-701

19

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §77-7-15
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §78-2A-3(2)(d)

iv

3, 15
1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has j u r i s d i c t i o n in t h i s matter
pursuant t o §78-2A-3(2)(d) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented on appeal are:
1.

Did the Circuit Court err in concluding that

the dispatcher did not have knowledge of any facts creating a
reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had committed or was
committing an offense?
The above-stated issue was the very focus of the
hearing

on

the

Defendant's

Motion

to

Suppress

and

has

therefore been properly preserved for appeal. [R-62-113]
In reviewing a trial court's determination that
there was not adequate reasonable suspicion to support a
traffic

stop, the

court

normally

applies

standards of review, one for the trial

two

different

court's

factual

findings and the other for the court's legal conclusions.
State v. Case, 884 P. 2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994) . The Utah Court
of Appeals explained the appropriate standard of review in
such cases as follows:
The trial court's factual findings
underlying its decision to grant or deny
a motion to suppress evidence are
examined for clear error. State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) . On the
other hand, the standard to be applied to
the conclusion of law, i.e., whether the
facts as found give rise to reasonable
suspicion,
"is
reviewable
nondeferentially for correctness, as
opposed to being a fact determination
1

reviewable for clear error." Pena, 869
P. 2d at 93 9. Nevertheless, the nature of
this particular determination of law
allows the trial court "a measure of
discretion
. . . when
applying
that
standard to a given set of facts."
State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994)
The only conclusion of law for the Court to consider on
appeal is whether the trial court erred in concluding that
there were insufficient articulable facts to give rise to a
reasonable suspicion of possible criminal activity.

This

conclusion of law should be reviewed nondeferentially for
correctness.
2.

Did the Circuit Court err in finding that the

complainant, Mr. DeWayne Olsen had no more than a hunch that
the man at Mr. Olsen's doorstep was the Defendant?
This second issue has also been properly preserved
for appeal as there was substantial testimony from Mr. DeWayne
Olsen on this point in the hearing on Defendant's motion to
suppress. [R-66-92]
In State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994),
the Utah Court of Appeals stated that a "trial court's factual
findings underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress evidence are examined for clear error." (citing State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 9332, 935-36 (Utah 1994)).
In addition, in order to overturn a trial court's
findings of

fact, the challenger

"must marshal

all the

evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings in
2

q u e s t i o n . " P h i l l i p s v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109 n . l (Utah
App. 1995).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

Utah Code Annotated, §77-7-15 i s s e t f o r t h verbatim
in the Argument s e c t i o n of t h i s Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

The Defendant was originally charged with Driving
Under

the

Influence of Alcohol, a class B misdemeanor.

Defendant claimed that the arresting officer lacked reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop of the
Defendant's vehicle.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant

filed

a Motion

to Suppress

Evidence

seeking to suppress any and all evidence obtained after the
stop of the Defendant's vehicle.

The Plaintiff filed a

Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Suppress.

The

Circuit Court held a hearing on the Defendant's Motion to
Suppress Evidence and heard testimony and received other
evidence and heard argument of Counsel.
C.

DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT

The Circuit Court granted the Defendant's Motion to
Suppress Evidence. The evidence which was suppressed included
a breathalyzer test which was taken by the Defendant.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On April 7, 1996, at approximately 5:15 a.m.,

Mr. DeWayne Olsen received a telephone call which Mr. Olsen
picked up.

There was no response on the line so Mr. Olsen

hung up and dialed a last call return mechanism and received
an answering machine message that indicated that this was the
Defendant Joseph Mulcahy's telephone number.

[R-66,68, and

69.]
2.
hang-up call.

A few minutes later, Mr. Olsen received another
Mr. Olsen again dialed a last call return

mechanism which again connected Mr. Olsen to the telephone of
the Defendant Joseph Mulcahy. Mr. Olsen left a message on the
answering machine of the Defendant stating that Mr. Olsen did
not want the Defendant calling or bothering him, especially at
that time of the morning and that Mr. Olsen did not want the
Defendant's telephone calls. [R-69-70]
3.

Either between the two hang-up calls or after

the second hang-up call, Mr. Olsen called Kaysville City to
inquire about how to register a complaint about the harassing
telephone calls. The person that Mr. Olsen spoke to asked Mr.
Olsen if he wanted to pursue the complaint at that time and
Mr. Olsen responded that he would wait until morning during
regular business hours to pursue the complaint, if at all.
[R-71]
4.

At approximately 5:30 a.m. the Defendant called

Mr. Olsen again and when Mr. Olsen answered the telephone, the
4

Defendant stated essentially "This is Joe. What's happening?"
Mr. Olsen reiterated again that he did not want to deal with
him, didn't want to talk with him, and didn't want him
calling. Mr. Olsen hung up immediately after delivering this
message to the Defendant.
5.

[R-72]

After Mr. Olsen hung up on the Defendant, the

Defendant called back a second, third and maybe a fourth time.
On each of these occasions, Mr. Olsen would hear who was
trying to call and would hang up.

Eventually Mr. Olsen took

the telephone off the hook for a few minutes.
6.

[R-72]

Prior to the Defendant's calls to Mr. Olsen,

Mr. Olsen had known the Defendant because the Defendant had
associated with Mr. Olsen's daughter.

On one occasion, Mr.

Olsen had sat down in his living room with the Defendant and
had talked to the Defendant for about an hour. [R-73]
7.
morning

of

When Mr. Olsen talked to the Defendant on the
April

7,

1996, Mr. Olsen

noticed

that

the

Defendant's speech sounded perhaps a little slow, a little
slurred.

The Defendant's speech was different than what Mr.

Olsen had noticed on prior occasions when he had talked to the
Defendant and Mr. Olsen believed the Defendant to be under the
influence of alcohol or intoxicated.
8.

[R-73-74]

At approximately 6:00 A.M., Mr. Olsen heard a

car drive up outside his house.

When the car stopped, Mr.

Olsen immediately got up and looked out his window. He saw a
male about the Defendant's size exiting the car.
5

Mr. Olsen

observed this individual heading towards Mr. Olsen7s driveway
which leads to his front door.
9.

[R-74-75]

Although it was somewhat dark outside and Mr.

Olsen was unable to clearly distinguish the facial features of
the individual, Mr. Olsen was at least reasonably sure that
the individual coming to his door was the Defendant.

[R-75,

87]
10.

When the Defendant reached Mr. Olsen's doorstep

he began ringing Mr. Olsen's doorbell a number of times. The
Defendant

remained

minutes.

[R-77, 90]
11.

on Mr. Olsen's

doorstep

Mr. Olsen did not want

for

several

to deal with the

Defendant because Mr. Olsen believed that the Defendant was
intoxicated and because Mr. Olsen did not know what the
intention of the Defendant was and because it was not a
reasonable hour of the day.
12.

[R-75, 90]

Mr. Olsen called 911 and told the dispatcher

that he had a drunk individual on his doorstep ringing his
doorbell. Mr. Olsen further stated that he did not know what
this individual's intentions were but he wanted to have an
officer over at the residence. The call to 911 was actually
made at 5:58 a.m. [R-75,77-78]
13.

The dispatcher confirmed that Mr. Olsen's name

was DeWayne Olsen and that he lived at 667 South 150 East,
Kaysville# Utah.

[R-78]

6

14.

The dispatcher sent an officer in the direction

of Mr. Olsen's residence.
15.

Some

time

[R-78,98]
later,

Mr.

Olsen

informed

the

dispatcher that the individual was driving off in a white
Toyota and was heading toward the "Main drag".

He told the

dispatcher that the vehicle was traveling east toward the
mountain and that that would lead on to the main road that
goes in front of Davis High School.
16.

[R-79-80]

Mr. Olsen informed the dispatcher that he had

earlier called to get some information about what he could do
about harassing telephone calls and informed the dispatcher
that the name of the person at his door was "Joe" and Joe's
telephone number was 774-9808.
17.
received

a

[R-81]

The dispatcher understood that Mr. Olsen had

harassing

telephone

call

and

that

Mr.

Olsen

believed that the person who made the harassing telephone call
was the same person who was at his doorstep
doorbell.

ringing

his

[R-81]
18.

At approximately 6:00 A.M. on April 7, 1996,

Kaysville City Police Officer Darron Heslop heard a dispatch
to any unit in the Kaysville area with regard to a "1047"individual believed to be drunk and ringing the doorbell.
1047 is code for suspicious vehicle, person or incident.

[R-

94, 98, 100]
19.
address

given

Officer Heslop left the office to go to the
in the dispatch.
7

While

on route

to

that

residence, Officer Heslop was advised by the dispatcher that
the suspect individual had left the residence in a white
Toyota and was heading towards Davis High School.
20.

[R-94,98]

Officer Heslop traveled from the location of

the Kaysville Police Department at 58 East 100 North in
Kaysville toward Davis High School.

Officer Heslop observed

that there was no traffic flow on the road and that it was
just beginning to get light outside.
21.

[R-95]

As Officer Heslop approached the area of Davis

High School, Officer Heslop saw the headlights of a vehicle
heading north on Main Street which vehicle passed Officer
Heslop.

Officer Heslop observed that the vehicle was white.

Officer Heslop first observed the vehicle at Davis High School
at the approximate location of the intersection of 200 South
and Main Street in Kaysville, Utah.

At this time there were

no other cars moving on the roads.

Officer Heslop believed

that the white vehicle he observed could possibly be the
suspect in this case.

Officer Heslop identified the vehicle

as a white Mazda.[R-95-96]
22.

Officer Heslop stopped the vehicle at the

location of 100 South Main Street in Kaysville, Utah. Officer
Heslop identified the driver of the vehicle as the Defendant
Joseph Mulcahy. [R-96-97]

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Complainant DeWayne Olsen had a reasonable
suspicion based on articulable
8

facts that

the man that

appeared at his doorstep at approximately 6:00 a.m. on April
7, 1996 was the Defendant Joseph Mulcahy. Mr. Olsen also had
reason to believe that the Defendant Joseph Mulcahy was
intoxicated at the time that the Defendant appeared on Mr.
Olsen's front doorstep and began ringing his doorbell.

The

Defendant's numerous telephone calls to Mr. Olsen at an
extremely inconvenient and unusual hour of the morning, and
the slowed and slurred speech which Mr. Olsen detected in the
Defendant's voice, reasonably led Mr. Olsen to believe that
the Defendant was drunk.
After having told the Defendant that he did not want to
talk with him or deal with him on the telephone, Mr. Olsen had
reason to be concerned and alarmed when the Defendant showed
up on Mr. Olsen's doorstep and began ringing his doorbell
repeatedly. Mr. Olsen had reason to suspect possible criminal
intent and/or criminal conduct on the part of the Defendant.
Mr. Olsen's statement to the dispatcher that he had a drunk
individual on his doorstep ringing his doorbell at 6:00 A.M.
on a Sunday morning constituted sufficient articulable facts
upon which the dispatcher based her reasonable suspicion that
the Defendant had committed or may have been in the process of
committing some criminal act.

The subsequent stop of the

Defendant's vehicle for questioning and investigation as to
these suspicious circumstances was, therefore, justified and
appropriate.

9

A R G U M E N T
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
COMPLAINANT DEWAYNE OLSEN HAD NO MORE
THAN A HUNCH THAT THE PERSON AT MR.
OLSEN'S DOORSTEP WAS THE DEFENDANT
In

its

order

granting

Defendant's

motion

to

suppress, the trial court found that the complainant in this
case, Mr. DeWayne Olsen, did not know the identity of the
individual who was on Mr. Olsen's doorstep
doorbell.

ringing his

The court found that "Mr. Olsen really just had a

hunch that he was the defendant, with whom he had talked on
the telephone within the preceding hour."
This finding of the trial court should be reversed
because it is clearly erroneous. See State v. Case, 884 P. 2d
1274 (Utah App. 1994).

A trial court's findings of fact are

clearly erroneous if they "are against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Accord State
v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah App. 1990).

The evidence which

was presented at the hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress
is insufficient to support the trial court's finding stated
above even considering all of the evidence which supports the
trial court's finding.
The following constitutes all of the evidence which
supports the finding of the trial court:
10

1.

Mr. Olsen testified that after hearing a car

stop in front of his house, he looked out the window and saw
a male about the Defendant's size exiting the car. Mr. Olsen
testified that he could not say for certain that it was him
(the Defendant) because there was still some darkness there.
Mr. Olsen further testified that he did not immediately
recognize Joe (the Defendant). [R-74]
2.

Mr. Olsen testified that he was reasonably

certain that the individual that came up to his door was Joe
but stated that he didn't have any absolute knowledge that it
was Joe. [R-75]

When asked by the dispatcher if he knew the

individual at his door, Mr. Olsen replied "I can guess who he
is, but I don't want to deal with him." [R-78]
3.

Mr. Olsen testified that he could tell that the

individual on his doorstep was a male and was about Joe's size
but Mr. Olsen could not distinctly tell if it was Joe or not.
[R-87]
4.

Mr. Olsen did not see the individual stagger

[R-86] , and could not tell if the individual had a short
haircut or light-colored hair or blue eyes. [R-87] Mr. Olsen
did not give a description of the Defendant to the dispatcher.
[R-87]
5.

Mr. Olsen didn't open his door and did not

smell any alcohol on the individual at his doorstep. [R-91]
Mr. Olsen could not identify the individual as the Defendant
although he was reasonably sure it was the Defendant. [R-91]
11

When Mr. Olsen told the dispatcher that the name of the
individual was Joe, he was assuming it was Joe based on Mr.
Olsen's earlier experiences and not based on any observations
Mr. Olsen made on his front porch. [R91]
6.

Mr. Olsen did not see the individual go back to

his car. [R-88]
7.

When describing the make and color of the

Defendant's vehicle to the dispatcher, Mr. Olsen was unable to
give a completely accurate description of the vehicle.

Mr.

Olsen described the vehicle as possibly a white Toyota Celica
when in fact the vehicle was a white Mazda. [R-79, 96]
8.

Mr. Olsen did not recognize the Defendant's

vehicle and was unable to associate the vehicle with the
Defendant. [R-92]
9.

When Mr. Olsen told the dispatcher that he

thought that the name of the individual was Joe, Mr. Olsen
wasn't really sure of Joe's last name. [R-85]
The sum total of the evidence which supports the
trial court's finding is that Mr. Olsen could not with
certainty visually identify the Defendant because of the
darkness and could not associate the suspect's car with the
Defendant. Mr. Olsen also could not see the Defendant stagger
and did not detect any odor of alcohol on the Defendant. This
evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding
that Mr. Olsen did not know or had only a hunch that the
individual at his doorstep was the Defendant.
12

Mr. Olsen did

not have an absolute knowledge that the suspect was the
Defendant.

However, he did know with a reasonable degree of

certainty that the suspect was in fact the Defendant. At the
very least, Mr. Olsen had a reasonable suspicion based on
articulable facts that the suspect was the Defendant.
A

"hunch" is essentially a belief or suspicion

unsupported by any articulable facts, while a "reasonable
suspicion" is a belief or suspicion which is supported by
articulable facts. State v. Menke, 787 P. 2d 537, 541 (Utah
App. 1990).

There is of course an important distinction

between a hunch and a reasonable suspicion because the latter
justifies an investigative stop of a defendant while the
former does not.
The trial court's finding that Mr. Olsen didn't know
the identity of the person at his doorstep or that at most Mr.
Olsen had only a hunch that it was the Defendant, is the
equivalent of finding that Mr. Olsen could not articulate any
facts which supported Mr. Olsen's suspicion that the suspect
was the Defendant. This finding is clearly erroneous because
there were several articulable facts which led Mr. Olsen to
strongly believe that the suspect was the Defendant.

These

articulable facts are discussed below.
First, Mr. Olsen had received numerous telephone
calls from the Defendant beginning at approximately 5:15 a.m.
that morning.

On some of these calls the Defendant simply

hung up before any conversation took place.
13

On at least one

call, Mr. Olsen explicitly told the Defendant that he didn't
want to talk to him and didn't want the Defendant calling.
The Defendant continued to call back several more times and
each time, when Mr. Olsen heard who was calling, Mr. Olsen
would hang up. Eventually Mr. Olsen had to take the phone off
the hook.
At approximately 6:00 a.m. Mr. Olsen heard the suspect
vehicle pull up in front of his house. Mr. Olsen saw a male,
about the Defendant's size exit the vehicle and come up to his
doorstep.

The individual began ringing Mr. Olsen's doorbell

a number of times.

Mr. Olsen had no reason to believe that

the suspect was anyone other than the Defendant.
Mr. Olsen's belief that the suspect was the Defendant was
not based on a mere hunch or guess.

He had just experienced

a pattern of numerous attempts by the Defendant to call him by
telephone at an unreasonably early hour of the morning. When
he refused to talk to the Defendant and took the phone off the
hook he then had an individual come to his door a short time
later at 6:00

a.m. while it was still dark out.

This

individual rang his doorbell a number of times. Having taken
his phone off the hook and having thereby thwarted the
Defendant's efforts to call him, it was reasonable for Mr.
Olsen to believe that the Defendant had decided to attempt to
communicate with Mr. Olsen in person.

This suspicion was

further confirmed by Mr. Olsen's ability to identify the
individual as a male and about the Defendant's size.
14

Because Mr. Olsen's suspicion that the suspect was the
Defendant was based on articulable facts, Mr. Olsen's level of
knowledge was at least a reasonable suspicion.

It was

therefore clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that
Mr. Olsen had only a hunch that the suspect was the Defendant.
POINT II
OFFICER HESLOP HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION
TO STOP THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE
A. The Reasonable Suspicion Standard Defined,
The United States Supreme Court has held that police
officers may stop and briefly detain an individual

for

investigative purposes when there is reasonable suspicion to
believe that the person may be involved in criminal activity.
United States v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)(citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ) ; See also State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255
(Utah App. 1992). This requirement has been codified in Utah
Code Annotated §77-7-15 as follows:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to
believe he has committed or is in the act of
committing or is attempting to commit a public
offense and may demand his name, address and an
explanation of his actions.
Unfortunately, the concept of reasonable suspicion is
not readily reduced to any firm set of legal rules. United
States v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) . However, the level of
suspicion required to justify an investigatory stop of a
vehicle under the above standard is of a lesser degree than
that required to support a finding of probable cause. United
15

States v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)(noting that "probable
cause means xa fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found,' and the level of suspicion required
for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for
probable cause.")

In determining the existence or absence of

reasonable suspicion in a particular situation the court must
look to the totality of the circumstances. United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989.
The reasonable suspicion standard does not require that
a law enforcement officer have certain knowledge that a person
committed a crime before effectuating a stop of that person.
It is not even required that the conduct giving rise to the
suspicion be illegal. Rather all that is required is that the
officer be able to articulate objective facts which justify
the officer's suspicion of illegal activity.

As the Utah

Court of Appeals noted in State v. Nguyen, 878 P. 2d 1183 (Utah
App. 1994):
"
the
conduct
observed
and/or
information relied upon need not be
illegal or describe illegal activity in
order to give a law enforcement officer
reasonable
suspicion
of
criminal
activity, so long as the officer can
articulate facts which form the basis for
his or her suspicion."
Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity may exist even
where the conduct relied upon in forming the suspicion is also
consistent with innocent activity as long as the conduct is
also

n%

Corp.

strongly indicative' of criminal activity." Provo City
v.

Spotts

861

P.2d

437,
16

440

(Utah

App.

1993).

Furthermore, reasonable suspicion may be supported by a series
of facts taken together, even where any one of the facts
standing alone would be insufficient to create a reasonable
suspicion. Id.
B. Officer Heslop Was Justified in Reiving on the Dispatch
Message in Stopping the Defendant's Vehicle.
A police officer who makes a stop of a vehicle is
not required to have first-hand knowledge of the facts which
create a reasonable suspicion that a Defendant committed a
criminal offense. Rather a police officer is entitled to rely
upon a dispatch or bulletin issued by other police officers.
In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 230-231, 83
L.Ed.2nd 604, 613 (1985) the Supreme Court held as follows:
We conclude that, if a flier or bulletin
has been issued on the basis of
articulable facts supporting a reasonable
suspicion that the wanted person has
committed an offense, then reliance on
that flier or bulletin justifies a stop
to
check
identification,
to
pose
questions to the person, or to detain the
person briefly while attempting to obtain
further information.
If the flier [or
bulletin] has been issued in the absence
of a reasonable suspicion, then a stop in
the objective reliance upon it violates
the Fourth Amendment.
* * * * *

Assuming the police make a Terry stop in
objective reliance on a flier or
bulletin, we hold that the evidence
uncovered in the course of the stop is
admissible if the police who issued the
flier or bulletin possessed a reasonable
suspicion justifying a stop, and if the
stop that in fact occurred was not
significantly more intrusive than would
have
been
permitted
the
issuing
[officers].
17

Officer

Heslop

was

justified

in

stopping

the

Defendant's vehicle based on the dispatch report indicating
that the driver of a white Toyota in the area of Main Street
and Davis High School

in Kaysville may have

committed

a

criminal offense as long as the Dispatcher who issued the
transmission
supported

a

had

knowledge

reasonable

of

suspicion

committed a criminal offense.

articulable
that

the

facts

which

Defendant

had

As the Utah Court of Appeals

noted in State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994) :
"
If the investigating officer cannot
provide
independent
or
corroborating
information through his or her own
observations, the legality of a stop
based on information imparted by another
will depend on the sufficiency of the
articulable facts known to the individual
originating
the information or bulletin
subsequently received and acted upon by
the investigating officer.11
The investigating officer need not be informed of
the facts known to the originating source.

.Id. at 1277, n. 5

(stating that an officer who receives a radio dispatch may
take it at face value and act on it forthwith but that the
state must show that legally sufficient articulable suspicion
prompted issuance of the dispatch in the first place.)
C. The Davis County Dispatcher Had Knowledge Of Facts Creating
A Reasonable Suspicion That The Defendant Had Committed Or Was
Committing A Crime.
The dispatcher who issued the radio bulletin in this
case had reasonable suspicion to believe that the Defendant
may have been involved in criminal activity. At approximately
18

5:58 a.m. on April 7, 1996 the dispatcher received a 911 call
from Mr. DeWayne Olsen indicating that a drunk individual was
present

on

his

door

step

ringing

the

doorbell.

The

information conveyed to the dispatcher by Mr. Olsen would on
its face raise a suspicion of several possible criminal
offenses justifying the dispatcher in sending out police
officers to more fully investigate the matter. At a minimum,
the facts relayed by Mr. Olsen to the dispatcher raised a
reasonable suspicion that the Defendant may have committed or
was in the process of committing the offenses of intoxication,
criminal trespass, driving under the influence of alcohol,
and/or telephone harassment.

A description of these four

offenses and an analysis of why there was reasonable suspicion
to believe that the Defendant had or was committing one or
more of these offenses is provided below:
1.
INTOXICATION, (Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
§76-9-701) as follows:
"(1) A person is guilty of intoxication if he
is under the influence of alcohol, a controlled
substance, or any substance having the property of
releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the person
may endanger himself or another, in a public place
or in a private place where he unreasonably
disturbs other persons." (Emphasis added).
The allegations of Mr. DeWayne Olsen regarding the
individual at his doorstep would meet the elements of the
above-described

offense

as

Mr.

Olsen

individual was drunk and was engaging
unreasonably disturbed Mr. Olsen.

19

alleged

that

the

in conduct which

2.
CRIMINAL TRESPASS, (Utah Code Annotated,
1953, §76-6-206) as follows:
11

(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass
if, under circumstances not amounting to burglary
as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6204:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully
on property and:
(i) Intends to cause annoyance
or injury to any person or damage to any
property, including the use of graffiti
as defined in Section 76-6-107;
(ii) intends
to
commit
any
crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii)
is reckless
as to
whether his presence will cause fear for
the safety of another; or
(b) knowing
is unlawful, he
property as to
entering is given

his entry or presence
enters or remains on
which notice
against
by:

(i) personal communication to
the actor by the owner or someone with
apparent authority to act for the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure
obviously designed to exclude intruders;
(iii)
posting
of
signs
reasonably
likely
to
come
to
the
attention of intruders."
The complaint of Mr. Olsen regarding the behavior of
the

individual

at his door

step would

suspicion of a possible trespass.

immediately

raise

a

The fact that Mr. Olsen was

complaining about the individual's presence at his doorstep
would

indicate

to the dispatcher

that

the person

welcome on Mr. Olsen's property and was apparently
annoyance and fear on the part of Mr. Olsen.
20

was not
causing

3.
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL,
(Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §41-6-44) as follows:
11

(2) (a)
A person may not operate or be in
actual physical control of a vehicle within this
state if the person:
(i) has a blood or breath
alcohol concentration of .08 grams of
greater as shown by a chemical test given
within two hours after the alleged
operation or physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a
degree that renders the person incapable
of safely operating a vehicle."
Mr. Olsen informed the dispatcher that the person at his
doorstep was drunk and later informed the dispatcher that the
individual was driving away in a white Toyota car on a public
street.

These allegations, if true, would meet the elements

of the offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol
and would give the dispatcher sufficient

facts to form a

reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was in the process of
driving while under the influence of alcohol.
4.
TELEPHONE
HARASSMENT:
(Utah
Annotated, 1953, §76-9-201) as follows:

Code

(1) A person is guilty of telephone
harassment and subject to prosecution in the
jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or
was received if with intent to annoy, alarm
another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten,
harass, or frighten any person at the called number
or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the person:
(b) makes repeated telephone
calls, whether or not a conversation
ensues, or after having been told not to
call back, causes the telephone of
another
to
ring
repeatedly
or
continuously;
21

Mr. Olsen informed the dispatcher that the person at his
doorstep was the same person who had been making harassing
telephone

calls

Communication
constituted

of

to

Mr.

this

sufficient

Olsen

earlier

information
articulable

to
facts

that

morning.

the

dispatcher

upon

which

the

dispatcher could form a reasonable suspicion of a violation of
the telephone harassment statute.
P. The Davis County Dispatcher Was Justified In Reiving On The
Allegations Of A Known Citizen Informant,
The allegations of Mr. Olsen to the dispatcher gave the
dispatcher knowledge of sufficient facts upon which to form a
suspicion that the Defendant had committed or was

in the

process of committing one or more criminal offenses.

It was

not necessary at this point that every allegation of Mr. Olsen
be verified or proven before the officers could
Defendant to make further inquiry.

stop the

A law enforcement officer

is and should be entitled to rely on information received from
a known citizen informant.
In State v. Miller, 740 P. 2d 1363, 1366 (UtahApp. 1987),
the Utah Court of Appeals discussed the reliability of a
citizen informant as follows:
The average neighbor witness is not the type of
informant
in need
of
independent
proof
of
reliability or veracity.
Rather, "[v]eracity is
generally assumed when the information comes from
an 'average citizen who is in a position to supply
information by virtue of having been a crime victim
or witness.'
Id. at 180 (quoting State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah
1983) .
22

The Oregon Court of Appeals also considered the inherent
reliability

of

information

provided

to

law

enforcement

officers by a known citizen informant in State v. Bybee, 884
P. 2d 906 (Or. App., 1994).

In that case, an employee of a

convenience store called a local police department and stated
as follows:
"x [I]
wanted to report a drunken driver.
[I'm] working down here at Ninth Street 7-11. He
came in just a minute ago. He's driving a blue,
looked like a MG, an older little sports car
convertible rag top."
The caller then gave a license number for the
suspect vehicle and gave his name and telephone number to the
dispatcher.

Shortly thereafter, an officer spotted the car

described by the informant and stopped the car based on the
dispatch message.
arrested for a DUI.

The driver of the car was subsequently
The Oregon Court of Appeals held that

when a report is received from a citizen informant, there must
be some indicia of reliability to the report.
The Oregon Court of Appeals considered three factors in
determining whether a citizen report is reliable.

The first

factor was "whether the informant is exposed to possible
criminal and civil prosecution if the report is false.

That

factor is satisfied if the informant gives his or her name to
law enforcement authorities or if the informant delivers the
information to the officer in person." State v. Bvbee. 884 P.
2d 906, 908 (Or. App., 1994).

The second factor is

"whether the report is based on the personal
observations of the informant.
An officer may
23

infer that the information is based on the
informant's
personal
observations
if
the
information contains sufficient detail that 'it
[is] apparent that the informant had not been
fabricating [the] report out of whole cloth...[and]
the report [is] of the sort which in common
experience may be recognized as having been
obtained in a reliable way...'"
Id. (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417-18,
89 S. Ct. 584, 590, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969).
The

third

factor

is

"whether

the

officer's

own

observations corroborated the informant's information.

The

officer may corroborate the tip either by observing the
illegal activity or by finding the person, the vehicle and the
location substantially as described by the informant." Id.
The three indicia of reliability analyzed by the
Oregon Court of Appeals are found in the present case. First,
the dispatcher knew Mr. Olsen's name, address and telephone
number and Mr. Olsen would potentially be exposed to possible
criminal and civil prosecution if his report was fabricated.
See Utah Code Annotated,

1953, §76-8-506.

Second, the

observations communicated to the dispatcher by Mr. Olsen were
based on his personal observations. Mr. Olsen had previously
talked with the Defendant that morning and had observed that
his speech was slurred and slowed to the point that Mr. Olsen
believed that the Defendant was intoxicated.
observed

an

individual

coming

up

to

his

Mr. Olsen
doorstep

at

approximately 5:58 a.m. on a Sunday morning and observed the
individual ring his doorbell a number of times.

Mr. Olsen

later observed the same individual whom he firmly believed to
24

be the Defendant, enter into his car and drive away in the
direction of Davis High School. The information communicated
to the dispatcher was, therefore, based on Mr. Olsen's
personal observations. Third, the information provided by Mr.
Olsen was corroborated by Officer Heslop as Officer Heslop
located the Defendant's car in front of Davis High School
which was where Mr. Olsen had informed the dispatcher that the
Defendant's vehicle was heading. The Defendant's car was the
only vehicle on the road at that early hour of the morning.
Mr. Olsen had also described the car as a white Toyota and the
Defendant's vehicle was, in fact, a white Mazda.
The report and allegations made by Mr. Olsen to the
dispatcher

were,

therefore,

reliable

and

constituted

a

sufficient basis upon which the dispatcher could form a
reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had committed or was
committing one or more criminal offenses.
C O N C L U S I O N
The

Davis

County

dispatcher

had

knowledge

of

articulable facts which created a reasonable suspicion that
the Defendant had committed or was committing one or more
criminal offenses based on the information supplied by Mr.
DeWayne Olsen.

Officer Darron Heslop was entitled to rely on

the dispatcher's transmission that a person driving a small
white vehicle in the area of Davis High School and Main Street
in Kaysville, had committed or was committing an offense.
Officer Heslop's stop of the Defendant's vehicle was therefore
25

justified

and

the

trial

court

Defendant's motion to suppress.

erred

in

granting

the

This Court should therefore

reverse the trial court's decision to grant the Defendant's
motion to suppress.
Respectfully submitted this

Icy

day of December,

1996.
KING Sc KING

By; ^S*-Z^^ (L - C^<Jt

STEVEN C. EARL, Esquire
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
330 North Main
P. 0. Box 320
Kaysville, Utah 84037
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ADDENDUM
Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence.

K:\Kays\Pros\Mulcahy.Abr
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D E F E N D A N T
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MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

'••":

JOSEPH MULCAHY
Defendant.

r ' '•

( -

:

Judt'e. Alfred

Defendant's Motion Ui Suppress Evidence ea>^ - . . . - •

? vVaizenen
;

- •

s

<

. lc&imiony and evidence was presented bv the plaintiff ;md the defendant and

ti)cn the mallei was lake.. ,.r(l • advisement by the Court. The Court having c a i d u l h consideicd
-

.-

I aw submitted

.Uaintiff and the defendant now

enters the following lindimr and o-,.i'
!IK.

. .

;

.

\.

...

-..•

*d lu stup me defendant, because he d;u i.ot obsci\L Lhc dekndjn 1 ,'»n;:nittine *n
attempting u vomnii; a pi;N;.: offense
I >'i li

Officer Heslop, in response to the radio disj....:

MK topped Hi Llflii iiiiLiiii iu 11111 lie • i mncKfii'iite the matter if the dispatch was issued

based upon articulated facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed
3.n i

.

;:<?

In tliis case, if the dispatcher received information or facts thai would support • easonable
suspicion that the defendant had or was committing an offense, it w
pimmimicaled to (lie ((^pal'i'lin* by Dc Wayne Olsen. An objective review 01 (hi- i^Mmom ^:id
evidence would show thai 1 >eWayne Olsen ti >M the dispatcher: "I have a drunken individual on
my door su., . .. ^ A

ation alon e • an • 3fficer was dispatched

toward the Olsen home. A few minutes later Mr. Olsen told the dispatcher: "He's getting into
a white car in my driveway. Maybe a Toyota Celica;" and "he is driving off, now he is going
east toward the mountain, then it will get into the main road that goes in front of Davis High
School." Shortly thereafter Officer Heslop stopped the defendant as he observed the defendant
in a white Mazda automobile driving in front of Davis High School.
The Court finds that DeWayne Olsen did not articulate any facts to the dispatcher which
would indicate a crime was being committed. He only said, "I have a drunken individual on my
doorstep ringing my door bell." He told absolutely nothing to the dispatcher which would
support his opinion that the individual was drunk. He didn't know who the individual was, did
not talk to him, and made no observations as to poor balance or bad driving or the physical
condition of the individual. Mr. Olsen really just had a hunch that he was the defendant, with
whom he had talked on the telephone within the preceding hour. Mr Olsen testified that during
that telephone conversation the defendant's speech was slowed and slurred and he was not using
good judgment and he thought the defendant was intoxicated. But none of these facts from the
telephone conversation were ever communicated to the dispatcher by Mr. Olsen.
The Court therefore finds that the dispatcher did not have knowledge of any facts creating
a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense. When
Officer Heslop stopped and seized the defendant in response to the dispatch which had been
issued in the absence of articulated facts setting forth reasonable suspicion, said stop constituted
an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment protections
under the United States Constitution and under Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The

2

Court therefore orders that any evidence obtained as a result of said search and seizure be
suppressed and not allowed to be introduced as evidence in this case.
Dated this

^—<''""» (A
1/1 ORDER 01 THE COURT:

ALFRED£. >AN WAGENEN
CIRCUIT/COURT II DGE

/f
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day of June, 1996Steven < Earl
Kaysville City Prosecutor
P.O. Box 320
K-.x^n:. ITT $ufm

Sharon S. Sipes
Miorney for Defendan t
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,s;< 25th Street
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